Copyright 1998, Journal of the Third World Spectrum 5, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 71-96.
Posted with permission on http://www.founders.howard.edu/Reprints.htm
This article may not be posted, published, or distributed without permission from The Journal of Third World Spectrum.
Disclaimer

Ethnicity and Ethnic Kings:
The Enduring Dual Constraint in Kenya's
Multiethnic Democratic Electoral Experiment

 Korwa G. Adar, Ph.D.

*This is a revised and an expanded version of an article which is to appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book entitled: African Democracy in the Era of Globalization to be published by the Witwatersrand University Press. I would like to express my gratitude to Rhodes University Council for the financial support which enabled me to carry out further research in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., on this project.

**Korwa G. Adar lectures in International Relations, International Studies Unit, Political Studies Department, Rhodes University. He has published many articles in internationally refereed journals. His recent publications include Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia, 1963-1983 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994) and The United States and Africa: From Independence to the End of the Cold War (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, Ltd, 1995) with M. Munene and J.D. Olewe-Nyunya.


Introduction
 

Over the last three decades(1963-1997) Kenya has held multiparty, 1963, 1992, and 1997 and single-party, 1969, 1974, 1979, and 1988, elections with the view to establish viable democratic electoral system. These experiments have, however, proved to be problematic for a number of reasons. First, the gradual centralisation of power within the Office of the President has rendered irrelevant the institutions responsible for the running of a free and fair elections. Second, the persistent appeal for ethnic support by the political leaders has institutionalised, albeit unofficially, ethnic-oriented electoral practices. Third, the political leaders have continued to use their ethnic origins as the main springboard for political leverage. Fourth, the Government, under the leadership of Presidents Kenyatta and later Moi, frequently invoked the oppressive sections of the Constitution inherited from the colonial Administration to undermine and suppress free and fair elections.1

This study examines the extent to which elections in Kenya are dominated by ethnic-oriented practices and as such undermine the possibility of the establishment of a viable national-oriented democratic electoral system. The central thesis of the study is that lack of sustainable democratic electoral system in Kenya was initiated prior to Kenya’s independence and reinforced thereafter by the Kenyan leaders themselves. The study is divided into three parts. First, part one examines elections and its relation to democracy. The second part examines the extent to which electoral processes between 1960's-1970's created conditions inconsistent with democratic electoral system. Similarly, part three deals with the impact of elections on democracy in Kenya, 1980's-1997.

ELECTION AND ITS IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY

Participation of the citizenry in elections and thereafter collective involvement of the elected officials in the decision-making process are important ingredients for the gradual establishment of democracy. Elections serve as devises for legitimacy, identification, integration, communication, participation, socialisation, and mobilization. 2 Indeed, it would be simplistic to argue that elections always lead to democratic systems. Elections can either lead to stability or it can have destabilizing effects. In some cases they can contribute to political development or political decay.3 Authoritarian leaders can use elections to legitimize their rule. This has been the case in Kenya for a number of years. Elections can also establish, maintain and promote democratic systems. Thus, elections are nation-oriented and can contribute to nation-building.

Competitive elections leading to a pluralist democracy discounts the relevance of single-party elections as instruments for establishing a democratic space. This is because in single-party elections only leaders at the lower echelons may be replaced, with the President as in the case of Kenya, remaining in power for decades. The top leadership always remains the same making elections to be nothing other than symbolic. This practice denies the electorate to freely determine leaders of their choice, thus hampering the possibility of the establishment of a democratic electoral system. Ethnic heterogeneity in Kenya and other African countries need not hamper a nationally-oriented competitive multiparty electoral process that can lead to democracy. The central issue here is the voter’s freedom of choice and sovereignty. Freedom of choice perceived to be entailed in competitive elections is central because of two factors. First, the voter has the freedom to elect candidates at all levels in the political system, a feature which has been absent in the Kenyan single-party systems. Second, the voter is exposed to different platforms of the competing political parties. His or her choice of a particular platform may lead to the establishment of a desired type of government. This in turn can constitute an important factor in determining governmental policies directly or indirectly. The central point to stress is freedom and rights of the individual to determine a government of his or her choice, a re-mergent movement sweeping across the continent of Africa in the post Cold War era. 4

What we have examined approximates what we call a competitive multi-party electoral model. This first model comprises of various identifiable elements such as the freedom of voters; competition between candidates and political parties without interference; accountability; the effects that elections have on governmental policies; nationally-oriented electoral-process, particularly from the top leadership; and freedom of choice by voters among candidates. This model differs from what can be called competitive single-party electoral model. This second model comprises of, for example, limited freedom of voters; competition among candidates at the lower echelons; lack of accountability; maintenance of the top leadership; dominance of one party, and the promotion of the status quo. 5 The argument here is that competitive multi-party elections consistently carried out as provided for in a country’s constitutional machinery can lead to the establishment of a democratic electoral system. Consistency is central in the sense that it would lay the foundation for a democratic culture following decolonization. This was the original hope of Africans following the removal of colonialism. As far as Kenya and other African states are concerned, democracy seems to have been associated with the absence of colonialism. The leaders gradually usurped power and eroded the chances for the establishment of sustainable democratic electoral systems, some even declaring themselves presidents for life (Banda of Malawi and Bokasa of Central African Republic).

KENYA’S ELECTORAL PRACTICE FOLLOWING DE-COLONIZATION:
THE KENYATTA ERA, 1963-1978

The struggle for the decolonization of the African continent was centred on the concept of self-determination of the African people.6 The removal of the colonialists set the stage for the establishment of democracy by Africans themselves. However, democratic electoral process was to face certain underlying realities of the colonial legacy on the one hand and the African leaders’ practises on the other. One of the major stumbling blocks in the case of Kenya was that the political parties that emerged prior to her independence were originally formed on ethnic lines and were mainly district (locally) based.7 This practise was encouraged by the colonial administration. The British colonial administration did not allow political parties to be established by Africans. Only district based associations were permitted by the colonialists. The associations which emerged at the time included, for example, Nairobi District African Congress(NDAC), the Nairobi Peoples Convention Party(NPCP), the Mombasa African Democratic Union(MADU), the African District Association (Central Nyanza)(ADA), the Abagusii Association (South Nyanza District)(AA), the South Nyanza District African Political Association(SNDAPA), the Taita African Democratic Union(TADU), the Nakuru District Congress(NDC), the Abaluhya People’s Association(APA), the Nakuru African Progressive Party(NAPP), the Mwambao United Front(MUF), and the Nyanza North African Congress(NNAC), among others, all of which were founded between 1955 to 1958. The first real national political party, Kenya African Union(KAU) founded in 1944, was proscribed in 1953 by the colonial administration.8

The Mwambao United Front (mwambao is Swahili for autonomy) was founded by the Arabs at the Coast mainly for three reasons. First, they feared that the "up-country people" would dominate the economy at the Coast. Second, conflict was already emerging between the Arab-Swahili landholders and the Coastal Africans over the issue of land ownership. Thus, MUF was seen as a vehicle which would protect their interests of the Arabs and the Swahili speaking peoples. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Arab-Swahili Coastal people founded the MUF to agitate for the unification of the Coastal Strip with Zanzibar. This was MUF’s official position at the 1962 London Lancaster Constitutional Conference where the Kenyan leaders at the time negotiated for independence. The Somalis of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya also formed their own movements to fight for the secession of the area to join Somalia. The main political movements involved in the secessionist activities at the time included, for example, the Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party (NPPP), the Northern Frontier Democratic Party (NFDP), the Peoples National League(PNL), and the National Political Movement (NPM). Most of the Somalis in the area voted in the 1962 referendum to join Somalia. The referendum was conducted by the British Colonial Administration prior to Kenya’s independence.9

These parochial ethnic-oriented associations encouraged ethnic loyalties and laid the foundations for the self-styled ethnic kings. The dominant leaders(or the ethnic kings) who emerged during this period included, for example, Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyuland- at least after his release from prison), Oginga Odinga (Luoland), Paul Ngei (Ukambani), and Ronald Ngala (Coast). They were viewed as nationalists as well as ethnic leaders who had dual responsibilities of championing the interests of their peoples at the national and ethnic levels. They were at the forefront against the colonial laws. It was not until 1954 that a new constitutional framework known as the Lyttleton Constitution allowed a multi-racial participation in the electoral process.10 However, it is important to note that in the Lyttleton Constitution one of the provisions "gave little satisfaction to the African community because an implementing statute placed a large number of restrictions on the franchise", the central mechanism for the establishment of a democratic culture and democrati electoral system per se.11

The demand by the Kenya leaders of universal suffrage which would have laid the foundation for a meaningful democratic process based on elections was also hampered by the Lennox-Boyd Constitution. The 1958 Colonial Constitutional recommendations did not take into account the under-representation of the African population in the Legislative Council. However, the real test for the political parties did not come until the 1961 elections.12 This followed the 1960 repeal of the emergency restrictions imposed because of the Mau Mau Movement. The repeal of the emergency restrictions paved the way for the formation of new political parties by the leaders who feared that there would be a possibility of dominance by the larger ethnic groups, mainly the Luos and Kikuyus. These two large ethnic groups dominated, at least at the leadership and membership levels, the newly founded Kenya African National Union (KANU). The smaller ethnic groups, instead, founded various political parties namely, Kenya African People’s Party(KAPP), African People’s Party (APP), Coast People’s Party (CPP), Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA), Maasai United Front, Coast African People’s Union(CAPU), and the Somali National Association(SNA), among others. Most of these numerous political parties amalgamated in June 1960 and formed Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which thereafter championed the interests of the smaller ethnic groups. KANU and KADU were therefore poised for political confrontation on ethnic lines with Kenyatta, Odinga, and Tom Mboya, among others, championing the political interests of the larger ethnic groups(mainly the Luos and Kikuyus) against Ronald Ngala, Paul Ngei, Masinde Muliro, and Moi emerging as leaders of the smaller ethnic groups. This put into question the chances for the establishment of a viable democratic electoral system. The only major uniting factor at this time was the issue of decolonisation.

The 1961 elections which tested the national viability of the newly formed KANU and KADU set the stage for ethnic-oriented differences. Thus, the 1961 elections served two purposes. First, it laid the foundation for the independence of Kenya. This was possible because of the African majority votes cast at the time. Second, it institutionalized within the framework of the two parties a dichotomy between the larger and smaller ethnic groups supporting KANU and KADU respectively.13 The latter party supported a majimbo (federal) Constitution. Federalism was seen as a viable option for the promotion and protection of the interests of the smaller ethnic groups. It was not until 1960, three years prior to Kenya’s independence, that nationally-based political parties were allowed by the British colonial Administration to be established. Thus, by the time Kenya acquired her independence in 1963 there was still lack of political culture based on nationally-organised elections devoid of constraints and democratic principles. That is, a democratic electoral system acceptable to the majority of Kenyans was still inchoate. Second, the differences which emerged between the dominant and smaller ethnic groups, we argue, were as a result of the colonial practises and promoted by the African leaders themselves. As stated earlier, the British Administration favoured non-African races in the political space.

In the 1961 elections out of a total of 1,411,117 registered voters with 884,786 voting, KANU obtained 63% of the votes (16 seats) and KADU got 16% of the votes (11 seats). However, KANU’s strength in the electoral outcome which ushered Kenya into an independent state was even greater in 1963 in which it won 83 out of 124 seats (or 67%) in the House of Representatives with 1,904,251 voting out of 2,659,700 registered voters.21 The May 1963 multi-party elections ushered in the KANU leadership to form the government at the time of independence. As Table One demonstrates, the smaller ethnic groups’ fear of dominance by the Luos and the Kikuyus is clearly reflected in the 1963 elections. The predominantly Luo Nyanza and Kikuyu Central regions voted solidly for KANU. The smaller ethnic groups captured other areas such as the Rift Valley, Coast and

TABLE ONE
T
HE 1963 KENYA INDEPENDENCE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGION KANU KADU APP INDEPENDENT
1.CENTRAL 17 0 0 0
2.COAST 2 9 0 2
3.EASTERN 10 0 10 3
4.NAIROBI 7 0 0 2
5.NYANZA 27 0 0 2
6.WESTERN 6 7 0 1
7.RIFT VALLEY 7 8 0 1

 Source: Daily Nation, May 20-29, 1963

 Eastern regions. It is also important to note that kingmakers (ethnic kings) dominated their respective regions, with Oginga Odinga, Jomo Kenyatta, Paul Ngei and Ronald Ngala sweeping Luo, Kikuyu, Kamba and Coast areas respectively. One of the most important points to note is the KANU-KADU Constitutional Conference compromise arrived at between 1962 and 1963. The original Constitution established a bicameral Legislature, comprising of the Lower House(House of Representatives) and the Upper House (Senate), in which the interests of the smaller ethnic groups were largely reflected. KADU insisted on a regional (federal) form of Legislature which was in the end provided for in the Kenyan Constitution. The 1963 general elections were therefore based on regionalism (majimboism) in which the Upper House comprised of Representatives from regions. KADU’s view was that the majimbo Constitution would neutralize the dominance of the larger ethnic groups.

It can correctly be argued that whereas the KANU leadership reluctantly accepted the majimbo Constitution in 1963, KADU on the other hand, remained fearful of its vulnerable and weaker position in terms of numerical strength. It is on this basis that we argue that the issue of dominance feared by the Africans during the colonial period took a different mould at the time of independence. This is because KADU was not only formed on the basis that its followers would be dominated by the larger ethnic groups but that its members participation in the 1963 General Elections clearly reflected fear of a new form of dominance, that is, Africans vis-a vis Africans. Thus, the protection of ethnic interests characterized the 1963 elections putting into question the reality of the establishment of conditions germane for a democratic electoral system. Although Kenya acquired independence after the 1963 multi-party elections the leaders began to question the validity of such a system. Tom Mboya, one of the influencial leaders at the time, in one of his official statements, for example, favoured a single-party system under a strong leadership.15 Tom Mboya’s view and the practice by the Kenyatta regime in general by way of convincing KADU to join KANU set the stage for the collapse of the multi-party system. Kenya remained a multi-party state until 1964 when KADU Members of Parliament crossed the floor and joined KANU, paving the way for a de facto one party system and officially burying the majimbo Constitutional framework. Kenyatta therefore remarked that "..the wrangling, the opposition for the opposition’s sake have now died forever. We shall work as one team for the sake of Kenya alone."16 This was a clear indication that the Kenyatta regime was uneasy with multi-partism. The merging of the two political parties paved the way for the gradual erosion of democratic electoral system.

The support for the single-party system in Kenya is based on the argument that multi-party politics created ethnic differences which can culminate into instability and civil war. This view reinforces the thesis that single-partism has a potential for promoting democratic electoral system.17 The year 1964 therefore witnessed the emergence of the support for the second model examined earlier in this study. It was because of the dislike of the multi-party electoral system, among other reasons, which prompted President Kenyatta to proscribe the Kenya People Union (KPU) in 1969. KPU was founded by Odinga and his followers after his resignation from KANU and as Vice-President in 1966. What needs to be emphasized is that the free and fair elections with candidates competing at all levels including the Presidency were unacceptable modus operandi during the Kenyatta era, 1963-1978. Indeed, it can be correctly argued that the elections held in 1969 and 1974 did not establish conditions necessary for the emergence of democratic electoral system. This was mainly because the electoral competitions remained at the lower echelons. President Kenyatta gradually began to centralise more power into his office. One of the consequences of this shift in the leadership style was the breaking of ranks with his Vice-President Oginga Odinga. His resignation culminated into what was called "Little General Election" in 1966 in which Members of Parliament who resigned with Odinga particularly from Luo Nyanza, were re-elected into Parliament reiforcing his dominance in Luoland. The main point to emphasize is that President Kenyatta began to be increasingly uncomfortable with those directly challenging his leadership. Kenya briefly remained a multi-party state from 1966 to 1969 when Oginga Odinga’s KPU was proscribed by Kenyatta thus once again plunging the country into a de facto one party state.

The elections that were held in 1969 and 1974 were carried out with KANU as the sole political party with 47% and 51% electorates voting in 1969 and 1974 respectively. President Kenyatta, tactfully, did not make Kenya a de jure one party state probably because he had already consolidated his power. The KANU elections of 1969 and 1974 were marked with what I call selection within elections. This unwritten practise witnessed the barring of candidates who were openly opposed to the leadership and the support of those considered loyalists or pro-establishment. Odinga, for example, was a victim of this practise on a number of occasions. Although a number of candidates vied for Parliamentary seats in each constituency President Kenyatta and his close associates usually earmarked (read, selected) those considered to be supporters of the status quo. Such candidates usually won the elections in the end even at the expense of the wishes of the voters. These practises put into abeyance the possibility of the emergence of a democratic electoral system.

It needs to be noted however, that the practise of criticism of the Government strongly established by the opposition before the proscription of the KPU in 1969 was carried over by the KANU backbenchers. This role of the "unofficial opposition" translated into the elections where a number of Ministers and Assistant Ministers lost their seats in the 1969 and 1974 elections. For example, in the 1969 elections out of 19 Minsters, 5 lost their seats. Compare this to the 1974 elections in which 4 out of 20 Ministers lost their seats. The situation regarding Assistant Ministers was even more revealing. In the 1969 and 1974 elections, for example, out 15 and 19 Assistant Minsters 14 and 16 lost their seats respectively. This accounted for a loss of 93% in 1969 and 84% in 1974 by the Assistant Ministers. The defeat of the Ministers and the Assistant Ministers did not necessarily mean a defeat for the Government or the Kenyatta regime and by extension KANU. It only meant the in-coming of new faces of KANU Members of Parliament because it was the only political party.

THE RETROGRESSIVE AND RELUCTANT DEMOCRAT:
THE MOI REGIME IN PERSPECTIVES

Under President Moi, who took over the Presidency in 1978, Kenya for the first time became a de jure one party state in 1982. Thus, KANU and its leadership began to usurp power from all socio-economic and political spheres. Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (MYWO-a national women’s organization ) founded in 1952 to deal with women’s issues nation - wide irrespective of their political affiliation and the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), an umbrella organization for most of the trade unions in Kenya, were officially incorporated into KANU during MOI’s rule. The objective was to widen KANU’s political strata. As one of KANU’s chairmen once stated, "...It would be appropriate to note that Parliament is one of the institutions of the KANU Government and accordingly, it makes laws which operate in accordance with KANU policies governing the affairs of the country. Therefore there is no conflict between party and parliament with regard to political supremacy."26 Such a view became the operational code and procedure for KANU in the Kenyan political scene. Kenya was made a one-party state through the 1982 Constitutional Amendment, Clause 2(a), which took only twenty minutes to pass in Parliament. Opposition or even dissenting views within KANU hierarchy was officially buried, with the backbenchers’ "unofficial opposition stance in Parliament" being forcefully dismantled.

Indeed, the institutionalization of one-partism was based on the assumption that henceforth Kenya was to become a monolithic society in which dissenting views were perceived to be non-existent both at the voter and parliamentary candidate levels. It was on this operational practise that Oginga Odinga and George Anyona were expelled from KANU following their announcement to form the Kenya National Socialist Alliance (KASA) in 1982. In order to consolidate his power President Moi called for elections in 1979 following the death of President Kenyatta in 1978. This conformed with the Constitutional provision that, should the Office of the President fall vacant the Vice-President would assume Presidential powers for a period of ninety days and that elections must be held within the period.

As was the practise during the Kenyatta era (1963-1978) Moi was never challenged in the Presidential elections. Moi and other seven Parliamentary candidates were elected unopposed in the 1979 elections. The General Elections of 1983 solidified Moi’s leadership with the practise of selections within elections taking root in a number of constituencies and the opponents, as was the case with KASA leaders, being quickly silenced. Moi, like Kenyatta therefore, presided over and excelled in authoritarian practises. However, the most controversial voting system was introduced in 1988 during Moi’s leadership. The queue-voting elections removed the voters impartiality and secrecy. It required that the voters queue behind the candidates of their choice during the preliminary elections. The practise of secret ballot was officially questioned. The system was opposed by many Kenyans but to no avail. The 1983 and 1988 elections "..were transformed to state controlled non-competitive elections."19 The queue-voting system not only removed the independence and the rights of the electorates, but it also set the stage for greater interference in the elections by the Presidency. It enhanced the practise of selections within elections established during the Kenyatta era. The system provided that candidates who received 70% of the votes during the nomination process were to be returned to Parliament unopposed. As a result of this undemocratic electoral procedure nearly 50% of the candidates were ‘elected’ to Parliament unopposed. The procedure " gave the party’s rank and file a final say in who should be cleared for party and general elections".20 The party became more important than the electorate thus solidifying Moi’s power and eroding democracy. Election in this case became an instrument for authoritarianism. Only those who supported the regime were selected.

The only real change occurred in the 1992 General Elections. This was as a result of the removal of Section 2(a) of the Constitution which allowed the introduction of a multiparty system. It was the first time since 1963 that Kenyans participated in a nation-wide multi-party elections. The question which arises is whether or not the 1992 elections were in conformity with the first model, that is, competitive multiparty electoral model, which would lay the foundation for a democratic electoral system. It is the contention of this writer that the 1992 elections did not meet the criteria of model one in toto. We argue that the leadership unwillingly accepted the multi-party elections. As a result most of the institutions established during the de jure single-party system remained intact limiting the chances for free and fair elections. For example, not all eligible voters were given the opportunity to acquire voting cards (of the total 11,194,506 eligible voters only 7,856,354 managed to meet the deadline).Second, the Opposition parties were on many occasions denied campaign permits. Fourth, the Opposition parties were not only denied the right to have a say in the determination of the composition of the Electoral Commission but they were also denied equal access to the media. Fifth, due to violence, harassment, arrests, intimidation of the Opposition and their supporters and the declaration of the so-called ‘KANU-zones’ in Moi’s

stronghold in the Rift Valley, over 41% of the KANU candidates from the area were returned to Parliament unopposed, that is, a total of 18 out of 44 Members of Parliament.

The introduction of the 1992 multiparty elections clearly demonstrated that President Moi is a consistent reluctant democrat. It required an overwhelming internal and international effort to force Moi to accept the removal of Section 2(a) of the Constitution. The US Ambassador at the time, Smith Hempstone, publicly emphasized that his government would only support those countries that "nourished democratic institutions, defended human rights and practised multi-party politics."21 Similar statements were made by the other embassies, particularly the European and the Japanese, accredited to Kenya during the period preceding the 1992 elections. The donors in 1991 deferred the Balance of Payments support to Kenya pending Moi’s implementation of economic and political reforms. Moi responded by registering a number of political parties.

A total number of nine political parties apart from KANU were registered and contested the 1992 General Elections. Table Two shows the main political parties which contested both the Presidential and Parliamentary multi-party elections of 1992. Of the eight political parties that

TABLE TWO
PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

PARTY CONTESTED

PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS

CONTESTED

PARLIAMENTARY

ELECTIONS

NAME OF

PRESIDENTIAL

CANDIDATE

KENYA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION CONTESTED CONTESTED DANIEL TOROITICH ARAP MOI
FORUM FOR THE RESTORATION OF

DEMOCRACY

(FORD-KENYA)

CONTESTED CONTESTED OGINGA

ODINGA

FORUM FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY

(FORD-ASILI)

CONTESTED CONTESTED KENNETH

MATIBA

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KENYA (DP) CONTESTED CONTESTED MWAI

KIBAKI

KENYA NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (KENDA) CONTESTED CONTESTED NG’ANG’A

MUKARU

KENYA NATIONAL CONGRESS (KNC) CONTESTED CONTESTED CHIBULE WA

TSUMA

KENYA SOCIAL CONGRESS (KSC) CONTESTED CONTESTED ANYONA

GEORGE

PARTY OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES (PICK) CONTESTED CONTESTED HARUM

MWAU

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) DID NOT

CONTEST

DID NOT

CONTEST

NONE

 

contested the Presidential elections only four, that is, KANU, FORD-K, FORD-A, and DP as shown in Table Three had any meaningful national impact. This was because the other parties lacked funds and were poorly organised. The parties that were denied registration and as such did not field Presidential, Parliamentary and Civic candidates included the Green African Party (GAP), the Green Party (GP), the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), the Kenya Nationalist People’s Democratic Party (KNPDP), the Party of the Proletariate and Peasants (PPP) and the Democratic Movement (DEMO). The latter had earlier transformed from the Tent of the Living God. These political parties were later registered prior to the 1997 General Elections. The emergence of the numerous political parties was as a result of the intrinsic differences among the ranks of the original founders of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) which started as a movement and was officially registered in 1991.

 A number of issues need to be put into proper perspective. First, Moi insisted prior to the 1992 elections that multi-partism would lead to ethnic conflict. As if to confirm his displeasure with multi-partism, conflict broke out in his stronghold, the Rift Valley Province, between the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins (Moi’s ethnic group). This state instigated conflict spread to some areas in Nyanza and Western Provinces with the Kalenjins "discovering"( with the help of the Government ) for the first time that it was necessary for other ethnic groups to move out of the Rift Valley. The government was accused of instigating the conflict which claimed more than 1,000 lives and created over 260,000 refugees. The Rift Valley was not only declared a "KANU zone" (read, Moi zone) during the elections but that many Opposition Parliamentary candidates were also denied the right to contest in the area. As a result, twenty KANU candidates, with eighteen from the Rift Valley alone, or 11% of the 188 Parliamentary seats were elected unopposed. Second, Moi, through his hand picked members of the Electoral Commission, established constituency boundaries which favoured the areas where he had more support. For example, the Rift Valley Province which had 1,919,672 registered voters had 44 Parliamentary seats. Compare this to the Central and Nyanza Provinces, Opposition strongholds, with 1,224,981 and 1,205,132 registered voters respectively having only 25 and 29 parliamentary seats respectively. This form of outright gerrymandering solidified Moi’s win in the elections and grip of power. Third, the division within the Opposition ranks not only led to the formation of many political parties but that most of their supporters were mainly ethnically based. This was clearly demonstrated in the 1992 election results as Table Three indicates. Each Presidential candidate won at least 70% of

TABLE THREE
THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING TREND BY PROVINCE

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING TREND PER PROVINCE
 

PROVINCE

KIBAKI DP

No. , % & seats won

MATIBA FORD-A

No ., % &

seats won

MOI

KANU

No. , % &

seats won

ODINGA

FORD-K

No. , % &

seats won

OTHERS TOTAL

VOTERS

NAIROBI 69,715

18%

0-seats

165,553

44%

6-seats

62,410

16%

1-seat(s)

75,888

20%

1-seat(s)

7,588

2%

100%
COAST 32,201

10%

1-seat(s)

33,999

11%

0-seats

188,296

62%

17-seats

42,420

14%

2-seats

9,660

3%

100%
NORTH

EASTERN

3,259

5%

0-seats

7,188

11%

0-seats

46,420

72%

8-seats

5,084

8%

1-seat(s)

3,082

4%

100%
EASTERN 392,481

50%

9-seats

79,436

10%

0-seats

290,372

37%

1-seat(s)

13,673

2%

1-seat(s)

7,849

1%

100%
CENTRAL 373,147

35%

10-seats

630,194

60%

14-seats

21,918

2%

0-seats

10,668

1%

1-seat(s)

2,320

2%

100%
RIFT

VALLEY

98,302

7%

2-seats

214,727

16%

2-seats

918,488

71%

32-seats

75,465

5%

2-seats

1,509

1%

100%
WESTERN 14,404

2%

0-seats

214,060

38%

7-seats

219,187

39%

9-seats

98,822

17%

3-seats

28,808

4%

100%
NYANZA 51,988

6%

1-seat(s)

10,299

1%

0seats

117,554

15%

7-seats

581,490

75%

20-seats

25,894

3%

100%
TOTAL VOTER No. 1,035,507 1,354,856 1,927,640 903,886 60,650 5,232,734

Source: Ajulu, Kenya’s 1992 Election, op. cit., p.5

the votes in his ethnic stronghold (Moi-Rift Valley, Odinga-Nyanza, Matiba-Central, Kibaki-Central). This trend of voting re-enforced ethnic chauvinism which has still plagued Kenyan politics and continue to undermine democratic electoral system. Matiba and Kibaki received a total 95% of the votes in their Central Province base clearly locking out the other Presidential aspirants. As Table Three indicates the three Opposition Presidential candidates also performed poorly in Rift Valley Province, Moi’s political backyard. It is also interesting to note that only

Ford-K won Parliamentary seats in all the eight provinces. This was followed by KANU (which was locked out of the Central Province), the DP and Ford-A respectively.

Both the DP and Ford-A failed to win any seats in North Eastern Province which is an area inhabited mainly by the Somalis. Whereas the DP won seats in five provinces, Ford-A captured seats only in four provinces with most of its Members of Parliament coming from Central, Nairobi, and Western Provinces. This means that Ford-A was the only Opposition party that failed to meet all the provisions of the 1992 Constitution of Kenya ( Amendment Bill) which provided for two main requirements. One was that a Presidential Candidate was required to secure a majority of votes cast in the elections. The other main requirement was that the winning Presidential candidate had to garner at least 25% of the votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces. The other Opposition parties failed to get a majority of the votes cast in the Presidential elections. The 1992 Amendment Bill also provided for a run-off in an event that none of the candidates emerges as a winner, but with 25% rule still applying. This rule was designed by the Moi regime to prevent a Presidential candidate from the larger ethnic groups from winning the Presidency by way of garnering a majority of votes from fewer provinces. Again, this was a clear sign of Moi’s fear of possible dominance by the larger ethnic groups. Moi himself was one of the founder members of KADU which supported majimboism.

Moi’s fear of a possible KANU defeat was further demonstrated during the 1992 registration exercise. Nearly 4 million eligible voters, particularly the youth who had just turned 18 years of age since the 1988 elections , were denied registration in 1992. The youth were perceived by the Moi Administration to be pro-Opposition thus creating a fear of a possible KANU defeat. In order to try to penetrate and influence the youth, the KANU leadership established what became known as Youth for KANU ‘92 (YK ‘92) and Operation Moi Wins (OMW). The leaders of YK ‘92 and OMW failed to deliver the youths to KANU but instead, particularly the former , embezzled billions of Kenya Shillings. A counter group, calling itself Operation Moi Out (OMO), was also formed but it was no match for the KANU funded youth bodies. It was because of the failure and the corrupt practices of the YK’92 and its counterpert the OMW that KANU decided not to establish such bodies for the 1997 elections.

The hope for establishing a democratic electoral system following the introduction of multi-partism in 1991 was dashed by the division among the Opposition’s ranks on ethnic lines and the perpetuation and legitimisation of Moi’s leadership at the end of the 1992 elections. The colonial laws such as the Public Order Act, Cap 56; Preservation of Public Security Act, Cap 57; Chief’s Authority Act, Cap 128; the Societies Act, Cap 108; and the Penal Code, Cap 63; among others, which still remained intact in 1992, were from time to time invoked by Moi and those under him even during the multiparty era. The elected Members of Parliament, for example, were still required to apply for licenses before addressing their own constituents and other public gatherings. On a number of accessions they were either denied licenses or were arrested if they defied the Government Administration officials, who are civil servants. All these issues, among others, in our view, have hampered the prospects for the establishment of democratic electoral system in Kenya. The Opposition has, since 1992, disintegrated even further through personality differences and selfish interests. 22

The only unifying factor for the Opposition at least before the 1997 elections was the issue of the Constitutional change. Spearheaded by academics, church leaders, non-governmental (NGOs), and students, among others, the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change popularly known as the 4Cs urged Kenyans, and the Opposition in particular, to focus their attention on the issue of the review of Kenya’s Constitution.23 The 4Cs transformed into the National Convention Assembly(NCA) embrassing not only the original founders but also political parties, with KANU being the only major party refusing to join the bandwagon. The central objective of the NCA as well as the National Conventions Executive Council(NCEC), the executive wing of the NCA, was to impress upon the Government to institute an inclusive mechanism for the Constitutional change prior to the 1997 General Elections. Initially, most of the Opposition parties accepted the ideas and as such sent their representatives to participate in the NCEC deliberations. The central theme in the meetings as well as the official position of most of the Opposition political parties was: "No reforms, No elections." Moi himself had stated publicly in 1995 that his Government was negotiating with foreign constitutional experts to study the Kenyan Constitution with a view to recommending to him the necessary Constitutional changes prior to the 1997 elections, a promise which, as expected, never materialised.

Moi’s reluctance to institute Constitutional changes solidified the resolve of the advocates for change, particularly the 4Cs and the NCEC, culminating into the demonstrations in the cities. These efforts by the pro-Constitutional change movement were enhanced by the International Monetary Fund’s decision in July 1997 to withhold $215 million to Kenya. The European Union followed suit by withholding funds to the Moi regime. It was through these internal and international pressure and tutelage that Moi, reluctantly, allowed his party, KANU, to meet with the Opposition parties to resolve the Constitutional question prior to the 1997 elections. Under the name, the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group(IPPG) the Members of Parliament resolved to remove some of the colonial laws already discussed in this study. The IPPG package also provided for the Opposition representation in the Electoral Commission, providing for the first time in Kenya’s history that the political parties were to jointly oversee the electoral process. The IPPG package had a number of effects. First, it paved the way for Moi to pull the Constitutional reform momentum away from the NCEC and the 4Cs. Second, it laid the foundation for further disagreements among the Opposition ranks. Some of the Opposition leaders argued that the IPPG package did not go far enough in overhauling the Constitution. Third, the pro-Constitutional change advocates, particularly the 4Cs, viewed the IPPG package as an appeasement of Moi and as such rejected its spirit on the ground that it did not go far enough in dealing with the central contentious issues related to the Constitution. Fourth, the donors came out in support of the agreement calling it "a step in the right direction" and in the process supporting Moi. Once again Moi solidified his grip on the direction of the Constitutional change, albeit nervously, which encouraged him to hurriedly announce the December 29-30, 1997 General Elections. The slogan of: "no reforms, no elections" was a forgotten issue among the Opposition ranks setting the stage for the disagreements with other members of the pro-reform movement. The announcement of the election time-table gave the Opposition parties only a few weeks to prepare themselves.

A total of 25 registered political parties with 14 presidential candidates contested the 1997 General Elections. 24 Moi not only used the tactic of registering almost all of the political parties that had applied for registration to divide the Opposition even further but that the system of gerrymandering had also been put in place by his Administration through the Electoral Commission. What is important to note is that the real Presidential contest centred on five candidates namely, Moi(KANU), Kibaki(DP), Raila Odinga(National Development Party of Kenya-NDP), Charity Ngilu(Social Democratic Party-SDP), and Wamalwa(Ford-K). Both Ngilu and Odinga had broken ranks with DP and Ford-K leaderships respectively. These five

Presidential candidates had strong ethnic-oriented support which was clearly reflected in the outcome of the elections.

As Table Four demonstrates Moi, Kibaki, and Raila swept their ethnic dominated

TABLE FOUR
PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY PROVINCE: THE 1997 KENYA ELECTIONS

 

PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY PROVINCE

PROVINCE KANU DP NDP FORD-K SDP
Nairobi 1 5 1 0 1
Coast 18 2 0 0 0
North Eastern 9 0 0 0 0
Eastern 14 8 0 1 10
Central 0 17 1 0 5
Rift Valley 39 7 0 3 0
Western 15 0 0 9 0
Nyanza 8 0 19 4 0
TOTAL 104 39 21 17 16

Source: Compiled from Electoral Commission of Kenya, Parliamentary Election Results per Election Results per Constituency, January 15, 1998

provinces, the Rift Valley, Central and Nyanza respectively, with Wamalwa(Western) and Ngilu(Eastern) registering strong showing in their areas of ethnic origin. KANU fared well in the Coast Province because many of the so-called "up-country people", a phenomenon of the 1960s, had been forcefully displaced through the alleged state-planned violence. More than 100 people lost their lives in the violence and hundreds of thousands displaced prior to the 1997 elections. Whereas in the 1992 elections Moi won at the Coast with 60% or 17 seats in Parliament in the 1997 elections he increased his margin by only 1% or 61% (18 seats). The issue need not be perceived in such simple terms. One of the objectives for the removal of the so-called "up-country people" was to try to defuse the emerging influence of the Islamic Party of Kenya under Sheik Balala, a man denied entry into Kenya (though he is a Kenyan) and forced to live in exile in Germany from 1995-1997. The other possible expaination is that his Government was warry about the growing Opposition support in the area.

One of the interesting points to note is that in the 1992 elections, Ford-A, under the leadership of Matiba, won 31 Parliamentary seats. However, in the 1997 elections the party’s Presidential candidate, the veteran politician and self-styled "people’s watchman", Martin Shikuku(who hails from Western Province), not only lost his Parliamentary seat but that only one Ford-A candidate made it to Parliament. This is a clear indication that most of the parties are mainly ethnically based. In the 1992 elections Ford-A won most of its Parliamentary seats from Matiba’s stronghold, Central Province. The 1997 popular votes reflect a clearer picture regarding ethnic-oriented voting pattern. Table Five indicates that whereas Moi won in the Rift Valley, his home-base, by 69% of the popular votes Kibaki and Odinga won by 89% and 57% in Central

TABLE FIVE
THE 1997 KENYA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS VOTING PATTERN

1997 KENYA ELECTIONS PATTERN
PROVINCE MOI

KANU

KIBAKI

DP

R. ODINGA

NDP

WAMALWA

FORD-K

NGILU

SDP

NAIROBI 75,272

20.56%

160,124

44%

59,415

16.23%

24,971

6.82%

39,707

10.85%

COAST 229,084

61.05%

50,540

13.4%

22,794

6.07%

11,156

2.97%

37,707

10.85%

NORTH

EASTERN

46,121

73.08%

11,741

18.60%

210

0.33%

4,418

7.00%

466

0.58%

EASTERN 368,801

35.87%

296,262

28.81%

7,755

0.75%

7,009

0.68%

332,578

32.35%

CENTRAL 55,822

5.5%

885,382

88.73%

6,812

0.68%

3,067

0.31%

29,473

2.95%

RIFT

VALLEY

1,140,109

69.00%

343,529

20.90%

36,022

2.19%

102,178

6.22%

11,345

0.69%

WESTERN 314,669

44.67%

9,755

1.38%

13,458

1.91%

338,120

48.00%

342.9049
NYANZA 215,923

23.52%

138,194

15.05%

519,259

56.55%

14,623

1.59%

15,309

1.57%

TOTAL 2445801 1895527 665725 505542 469807

Source: The Weekly Review, January 9, 1998

and Nyanza respectively. The Presidential voting pattern in Central Province clearly shows that Kibaki almost locked-out other candidates, a factor which can also be attributed to the absence of Matiba. Matiba had decided not to participate in the elections and did not even bother to register as a voter. Kibaki also defeated other candidates in Nairobi which was won by Matiba in the 1992 elections. Nairobi is largely inhabited by the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru(GEMA) groups who are mainly from the Central Province.

The disintegration of the Opposition; the rule which requires that a Presidential candidate must win at least 25% of the votes cast in five or more of the eight provinces; and gerrymandering; have all worked in favour of Moi in the last two multiparty elections. In the 1992 elections the Opposition parties together received 64% of the total votes cast, but they only managed to get 46% of the seats in Parliament. In the 1997 elections Moi received about 2.5 million votes cast or 40% of the 6.1 million total votes cast. The Opposition, as in 1992, got over 60% of the votes cast or 3.6 million. The outcome of the 1997 elections has, however, reduced KANU’s dominance in Parliament with 113 against Opposition’s 109. Another stumbling block for KANU is the IPPG package which allows the Opposition to share in the nomination of 12 Members of Parliament, originally the prerogative of the President. Thus, KANU nominated only 6 Members of Parliament with the Opposition sharing the other 6 seats according to their numerical strength in Parliament(DP nominated 2 while NDP, SAFINA, Ford-K, and SDP nominated one each).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

What I have demonstrated in this study is that elections which have been conducted in the post-independence Kenya have not laid the foundation for viable democratic electoral system. There are three main underlying constrains which perpetuate this problem. First, the Kenyan leaders have persistently appealed to their ethnic groups during elections making the electoral process to be more ethnic-centred as opposed to issue-centred contest. Second, there have emerged since Kenya’s indipendence what I have called "ethnic kings" or "self-styled ethnic leaders" purporting to represent and champion the interests of their ethnic groups. This leadership style is based on the unofficial position that a leader must have a home support (read, ethnic-support). Third, ethnic-oriented voting pattern arise because the control of the state power also translates into socio-economic and political benefits. 25 The voters view the political leaders, the apparent "controllers" of the state, as their potential sources of income-whether through employment or development. Ethnic-voting pattern, therefore, revolves around this perception. With the Government controlling the state resources and the President and his close associates at its helm the allocation of the resources becomes an ethnic contest. The general practice in Kenya, therefore, is that the President and his close associates channel development only in areas where they have political support. It is this, among the other reasons that I explained in the study, which determines the voting trend.

The voters turnout during elections also indicates an interesting trend in Kenyan elections. The diminishing and fluctuating interest in voter turnout since 1963 indicates the dissatisfaction with the regimes and the electoral system. Table Six shows that over the years the voter turnout was higher during multiparty(1961, 1963, 1992 and 1997) as compared to single-party(1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, and 1988) elections. The voter turnout was high in 1979 General Elections

 TABLE SIX
REGISTERED VOTERS AND VOTER TURNOUT IN ELECTIONS, 1961-1997

 

YEAR

REGISTERED VOTERS

VOTERS TURNOUT

% TURNOUT OF

REGISTERED VOTERS

1961

1,411,117

884,786

63%

1963

2,659,700

1,904,251

72%

1969

3,666,329

1,714,847

47%

1974

4,449,189

2,643,687

59%

1979

5,529,571

3,721,514

67%

1983

7,269,586

3,338,394

46%

1988

6,091,798

2,241,962

37%

1992

7,956,354

5,221,889

66%

1997

8, 555, 025

5, 884, 932

69 %

because President Moi, the sole candidate, had promised to clean the Government of corruption, provide employment, and establish democratic institutions. A promise which he not only failed to deliver but that his Government has to a great extent institutionalised corruption. Another important point which has been demonstrated in this study is that the problems that the Opposition parties have faced vis-a-vis the KANU Government since the 1992 election have largely been as a result of their differences. Matiba not only abandoned the party he helped shape and finance - that is, Ford-A - because of personality differences but that prior to the 1997 elections the party further disintegrated into three, Ford-A, (headed by Martin Shikuku), Ford-People (headed by Kimani wa Nyoike), and Saba Saba Asili(headed by Matiba). The rise of Ngilu in Ukambani(Eastern), her home base (within the meaning of Kenyan ethnic-oriented political context) reduced the DP’s performance. Ngilu(SDP) received 33% of the votes in her Eastern Province area against Kibaki’s 28%. In the 1992 elections Kibaki received 50% of the votes in the same area as a Presidential candidate. The point to emphasize is that ethnicity still dominates Kenya’s electoral process.

 

REFERENCES

1. See, generally P. H. Okondo, A Commentary on the Constitution of Kenya (Nairobi: Phoenix Publishers, 1995).

2. Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1075) p.2. and V.O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections" Journal of Politics, XVII (February 1995), p.5.

3. Palmer, op.cit., p.7. For a detailed analysis of the meaning of political development and political decay see for example, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribers, 1958); Alex Inkeles and David Smith, Becoming Modern (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Dave E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); and Samuel P. Huntington,"Political Development and Political Decay" World Politics XVI (April, 1965): 396-340.

4. See generally, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa , vol. 2, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

5. Guy Hermet, "State Controlled Elections: A Framework", in Guy Hermet and Richard Rose and Alain Rouquie (eds),Elections Without Choice (London: Macmillan Press, 1978):p.1.

6. For a more detailed analysis of the meaning of self-determination as it relates to democracy, see Korwa G. Adar "Changing Patterns of Democracy and Self- Determination in Africa: A Conceptual Re-appraisal", Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, forthcoming and Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization (Cambridge: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University,1964), and Korwa G. Adar. "The Principles of Self-Determination andTerritorial Integrity Make Strange Litigants in International relations: A Recapitulation",Indian Journal of International Law, 26(314) (July-December 1986);425-447.

7. See generally Sorobea N. Bogonko, Kenya, 1945-1963: A Study in African National Movements (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1980).

8. B. A. Ogot "The decisive Years: 1956-1963:, in B.A.Ogot and W.R. Ochieng’ (eds) Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93 (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1995),p.52.

9. For details on the issue of the NFD secession see, for example, Korwa G. Adar, Kenya Foreign Policy Behaviour Towards Somalia, 1963-1983 (Lanham: University Press of America,1994); I.M. Lewis "The Problem of the Northern Frontier District" Race and Class 5(1) (July 1963): 48-60; and John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London: Pall Mall, 1964).

10. United Kingdom, Command 9103:Kenya: Proposals for a Reconstruction of the Government (London: H.M.S.O.,1954),p.3-4.

11. J.B.Ojwang’ Constitutional Development in Kenya: Institutional Adaptation and Social Change (Nairobi: Acts Press, 1990),p.33.

12. Ibid, p.35.

13. See generally Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B.McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970).

14. National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU), The Multi-Party General Elections In Kenya, 29 December, 1992:The Report of the National Election Monitoring Unit(NEMU)(Nairobi: Election Monitoring Unit, 1993)pp.4-5; and Charles Hornsby and David Throup "Elections and Political Change In Kenya", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 33(2)(July 1992):172-199.

15. Kenya, Official Report, The House of Representatives, vol.3, Part 3,November 10, 1964 cols: 4416-4417.

16. Ibid.

17. See for example Carol Lancaster,"Democracy in Africa", Foreign Policy 85)(Winter, 1991-92): 148-165; Samuel Decalo," The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa," African Affairs 91(1992): 7-35.

18. Rok, Ajulu, "Kenya’s 1992 Election and its Implications for Democratisation in Sub- Saharan Africa", FGD Occasional Paper No.9, March 1997, p.8. See also generally Rok Ajulu "Kenya: The Road to Democracy", Review of African Political Economy 53(1992);Rok Ajulu"The 1992 General Elections: A Preliminary Survey" Review of African Political Economy 56(1994), Peter Anyang-Nyongo,"State and Society in Kenya:The Disintegration of the Nationalist Coalition and the Rise of Presidential Authoritarianism,"African Affairs 88(1989), Charles Hornsby "The Social Structure of the National Assembly in Kenya, 1963-1983" Journal of Modern African Studies 27(2)(1989):275-296, C.Hornsby,"The Member of Parliament in Kenya, 1969-83," unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Oxford University, 1986. M.P. Maren"The Dissolution of Democracy,"Current History (May 1987):209-229 and Weekly Review, 1987.

19. National Monitoring Unit, op. cit.

20. B.A. Ogot,"The Politics of Populism", in Ogot and Ochieng’,(eds), Decolonization and Independence op.cit.,p.207.

21. See "Storm over the USA’s views," The Weekly Review, May 11,1990,p.14. See also "US Envoy Steps into Political Firestorm in Kenya", New York Times, May 6, 1990,p.13 and Barbara Grosh and Steven Orvis, Political Conditionality, Democratization and Economic Performance in Africa: Aid in Kenya in the Post Cold War Era (New York: Centre for Policy Research, Syracuse University, n.d.),p.5 and generally, Smith Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (Sewanee, TN.: University of the South Press, 1997).

22. B.A. Ogot, "Transition From Single-Party to Multi-Party Political System, 1989-93 in Ogot and Ochieng’ (eds) Decolonization and Independence, op.cit.,p.247. See also, Nairobi Law Monthly 40 (January 1992), pp.17-18.

23. The author was one of the original founders of the 4Cs. It is a non-partisan NGO founded by academics, lawyers, religious leaders, women organizations, the youth and students.

24. The Presidential popular and percentage national electoral outcome were as follows: Moi(KANU-2,445,801or 40.12%); Kibaki(DP-1,895,527 or 31.09%); Raila Odinga(NDP-665,725 or 10.92%); Wamalwa(Ford-K-505,542 or 8.29%); Ngilu(SDP- 469,807 or 7.71%); Martin Shikuku(Ford-A-36,302 or 0.60%); Katama Mkangi(Kenya National Congress-23,484 or 0.39%); George M. Anyona(Kenya Social Congress-16,294 or 0.27%); Kimani wa Nyoike(Ford-People-8,564 or 0.14%); Koigi wa Wamwere(Kenya National Democratic Alliance-7,463 or 0.12%); Munyua Waiyaki(United Patriotic Party of Kenya-6,103 or 0.10%); Godfrey K. M’Mwireria(Green African Party-4,555 or 0.07%); Wangari M. Maathai(Liberal Party of Kenya-4,133 or 0.07%); Stephen O. Oludhe(Economic Independence Party-3,653 or 0.06%); and David W. Ng’ethe(Umma Patriotic Party-3,526 or 0.06%). Shikuku, Mkangi, Nyoike, Wamwere, Waiyaki, M’Mwireria, Maathai, Oludhe, and Ng’ethe also failed to win their Parliamentary seats. The political parties that participated in the elections but did not field presidential candidates included SAFINA, Party of Independent Candidates, Shirikisho Party of Kenya, Labour Party Democracy, Democratic Assistance Party, Republican Reformed Party. The Reform of Political and Kenya Union, New Peoples Democratic Party, Kenya Nationalist Party, Kenya Socialist Party, Peoples Party of Kenya, and Federal Party of Kenya did not participate in the elections.

25. Rok Ajulu, "Plus ca Change Plus ca Reste le Meme: Kenya’s Democracy Experiment, The 1997 Elections", Paper Presented in the Political Studies Department, Rhodes University, Seminar Series, March 10, 1998; Roger Southall, "Moi’s Flawed Mandate: The Crisis Continues in Kenya", Paper Presented in the Political Studies Department, Rhodes University, Seminar Series, March 10, 1998, and Irene K. Muriuki, "My Experience at the Electoral Commission", Her Overview of the performance of the Electoral Commission in the 1997 Elections. Muriuki worked as an intern at the Kenya Electoral Commission before she joined Political Studies Department, Rhodes University, as an M.A. student in 1998. See also, Stephen N. Ndegwa, "Citizenship and Ethincity: An Examination of Two Transition Movements in Kenyan Politics", American Political Science Review, 91(3)(September 1997): 599-615; Joel Barkan, "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Elections", Journal of Democracy, 4(July 1993): 85-99. Frank Holmquist and Michael Ford, "Stalling Political Change: Moi’s Way in Kenya", Current History, 94(April 1995): 177-181; Kenya Catholic Bishops, "A Call to a Change of Heart", Pastoral Letter, Nairobi, Kenya; Githu Muigai, "Ethnicity and the Renewal of Competitive Politics in Kenya", in Harvey Glickman (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa (Atlanta: African Studies Association Press, 1995): 161-196 and National Council of Churches of Kenya, The Cursed Arrow: A Report on Organized Violence Against Democracy in Kenya (Nairobi: NCCK 1992).

 

Disclaimer
Howard University is permitting the links provided by this official homepage to other homepages as a service to its client community. However, Howard University neither has nor assumes any responsibility or liability, either express or implied, for any such links or the accuracy or completeness of any
information or service provided by any homepage or entity to which this homepage is linked.

The use of the links provided by this homepage is on an "as is" basis and at the user's sole risk. The links provided by this homepage are not intended to be and are not endorsement of any service, product, company or University position, nor do they necessarily reflect the views, philosophy, will, intent, or participation of Howard University or any of its organizational entities.